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Abstract 
Environmental crises, and other global challenges, reveal ongoing conflicts of value. 
This essay contributes to the examination of the role of the assumptions underlying 
perceptions of value in the conflicts of competing value systems. The objective of this 
study is to try to understand how the construction of these value structures confines 
human interactions, and how such interactions can be emancipated. Through a 
historical, material, and dialectical approach, assumptions and processes hidden behind 
notions of value are scrutinized. This investigation suggests that concepts of value 
conceal a complex process of evaluation of potential interactions based on uncertainty-
eliminating information accumulated historically from past interactions. Evaluation is 
made possible through knowledge arising from Culture. The implication of this is that 
critically conscious evaluation has the potential of generating innovative interactions 
enabling human integration in the Environment. However, access to the common pool 
of knowledge, symbolized by Culture in all its representations, must be fostered.  
 
JEL-codes: Q50, Z10 
Key-words: value, evaluation, information, Culture, Environment, critical 
consciousness 
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Resumo 
As crises ambientais, e outros desafios globais, revelam contínuos conflitos de valor. 
Este ensaio contribui para a avaliação do papel das suposições, implícitas nas noções de 
valor, nos conflitos entre sistemas de valor concorrentes. O objetivo deste estudo é 
tentar compreender como a construção de estruturas de valor confina as interações 
humanas, e como essas interações podem ser emancipadas. Através de uma abordagem 
histórica, material, e dialética, suposições e processos escondidos atrás de noções de 
valor são escrutinadas. Esta investigação sugere que os conceitos de valor ocultam um 
complexo processo de avaliação de potenciais interações baseadas em informação 
eliminadora-de-incerteza acumulada historicamente de interações passadas. A avaliação 
é tornada possível através de conhecimento decorrente da Cultura. A consequência 
disso é que a avaliação criticamente consciente tem o potencial de gerar interações 
inovadoras permitindo a integração humana no Ambiente. Contudo, o acesso a este 
fundo comum de conhecimento, simbolizado pela Cultura em todas as suas 
representações, deve ser impulsionado. 
 
Códigos-JEL: Q50, Z10 
Palavras-chave: valor, avaliação, informação, Cultura, Meio Ambiente, consciência 
crítica 
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Introduction 
This investigation started from what seemed years earlier as a random collection of 
unconnected questions that suddenly converged into a sort of an existential question. 
Why should anyone care about the Environment or anything else if we are nothing but a 
random collection of particles in an already determined everlasting race against entropy 
competing to replicate what was achieved by pure coincidence in an ultimately 
meaningless and purposeless universe? 
Answering this question is, of course, not the goal of this essay. But it does, however, 
offer a direction of research that starts from the simple observation that there are people 
who care about the Environment and some who don’t. So, what is it about the 
Environment that some value and others don’t? This leads to another question: what is 
value, anyways? We hear the word all around: in the speech of politicians talking about 
national values, clerics preaching religious values, and economists predicting market 
values. So, what is this ambiguous notion of ‘value’ really about? This quickly escalates 
to a realization perfectly illustrated by David Harvey: 
If you think you can solve a serious environmental question like global 
warming without actually confronting the question of by whom and how the 
foundational value structure of our society is being determined, then you 
are kidding yourself. (2010, p. 21) 
This attempt to expose the building blocks of value structures reveals a deeper challenge 
regarding the methodology to be chosen that should acknowledge conflicts that arise 
between theoretical models and reality.  
 “The economists are in a dismal state precisely because they look upon 
their discipline as a science whereas it is actually no more than a 
sophisticated apology for the social and economic status quo. They 
evidently do not perceive the real nature of their profession and thus are 
deeply disturbed by the growing discrepancy between their theories and 
reality.” (Mattick, 1978, p. vii) 
Theories then diverge from reality, so the methodology of research and description 
should take that into consideration. It is crucial then to start by a description of some of 
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the ways the nature of reality is perceived differently and the implication of that on the 
methodology of this research and the question of value.  
What is value? This question seems to presuppose that value is something static, or at 
least that it has some sort of a hidden fixed form, and that there is an already existing 
universal form of value waiting for an adequate theory to uncover it. Such assumption is 
linked to a particular view of reality. In ancient Greece for example, Parmenides of 
Elea, a pre-Socratic philosopher, postulated that ‘what-is’ is one, whole and uniform, 
timeless, unchanging, and perfect. Or at least, this is what seems to be understood by 
many analyses of what was salvaged from his poem, On Nature (Palmer, 2016). 
Another interpretation came to see change as an illusion and to describe some level of 
reality where forms are fixed and perfect. It is this particular reading that will, according 
to David Graeber (2001), define Western philosophy and science for the next couple of 
millennia. 
One benefit of visualizing such level of reality that is free from change is that it enables 
us to discern graspable ‘things’, biological and non-biological, material and nonmaterial 
alike. We construct, accordingly, models that are made from fixed perfect forms. Those 
models are the basis of modern science and, through it, a technology that gives us 
immense capacity to change reality! (Graeber, 2001) 
But, wasn’t reality supposed to be unchanging and perfect? Well, that is exactly how 
substituting reality for the model creates problems, replies Graeber (2001). It turns out, 
the whole trick of ‘unchanging’ lies in its connection to ‘timeless’ since change happens 
in time. One thing then is to remove time, in its historical sense, to study a mechanism 
to the best we can; another thing is to see reality and try to interact within and with it as 
if time and history don’t actually exist. 
Now it is quite possible to believe that the Ultimate Truth1 is one, timeless, and 
unchanging but it is hardly the place to debate that. It is mandatory, however, to argue 
that a reality that we would wish to understand and interact with has to be, by definition, 
time-bound (i.e. historical) and thus changing. Another pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, 
Heraclitus of Ephesus, is believed to have described reality, accordingly, as one of 
                                                           
1 or Reality, What-is, etc. 
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continuous flux (Graham, 2015). Thus, apparent objects are, in fact, patterns of change. 
This gives us a beautiful dynamic approach but it leaves us with no ability to draw 
precise borders or distinctions (Graeber, 2001). 
We end up then with two ways through which reality reveals itself to us or, one might 
say, two different tools to view reality. One with which we are able to establish 
momentary boundaries separating between ‘things’ that interact, losing in the process 
the dimension of historicalness where change and transformation are possible. The 
second dissolves ‘things’ into an ever-changing existence leaving it hard, therefore, to 
recognize interactions between such evanescent ‘things’. This is, perhaps, the reason 
why Karl Marx’s method, that attempts to juggle between the two, is called historical 
materialism. It is materialism insofar the ‘things’ it describes are material2, and it is 
historical as long as it recognizes time and change. But this approach is also dialectical 
and not causal. It deals with dialectical relations and processes. Commenting on Marx’s 
method, David Harvey (2010) remarks that a process is not a ‘thing’. A ‘thing’ is a 
representation of the process that is in turn objectified in the ‘thing’. 
Attempting to describe such dynamic, complex, and dialectical reality through 
seemingly static words and linearly flowing text proves to be a daunting task. Taking 
that into consideration and given the existential nature of the question from which this 
investigation starts, this essay attempts to tell a meaningful story trying to cover, 
through what could appear at times as an intricate language, the various interactions in 
play from different perspectives. 
One of the objectives of this investigation is to try to understand how assumptions 
underlying concepts of value bound human interactions. The second is to imagine how, 
by revealing the complex processes concealed behind these ideas of value, interactions 
can be emancipated. The relevance of this topic lies in the possibilities it could 
potentially open for understanding the reasons that lead to environmental conflicts, how 
they originate in conflicts between value structures, and how environmentally-sound 
interactions can be better conceived. Through a historical, material, and dialectical 
approach, assumptions and processes hidden behind notions of value are thus 
scrutinized. 
                                                           
2 in the very wide sense of the word 
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The first chapter of this work digs in the notion of value in a bid to reveal the apparent 
commensurability of things, the reason behind their divergence, and the knowledge 
arising from interactions that make value a feature characteristic of Culture. The second 
chapter is a survey of some of the different ways value structures limit interactions by 
confining knowledge. The third chapter, on the other hand, is an attempt to imagine how 
the emancipation of the process of evaluation from the value structures confining it can 
lead to generating critical, conscious, and innovative interactions creative of Culture. 
Interactions that would lead us to integrate in our Environment. 
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1. Value as a specificity of Culture 
 “Out of touch with my roots in nature, I would be adrift, alienated and 
separated, and I would experience the apparent meaninglessness of life so 
widely felt in this age of technological and material progress.”  
(Hines, 1991, p. 28) 
***** 
Value is undoubtedly a very slippery notion. In his book Toward an Anthropological 
Theory of Value, Graeber (2001) observes how anthropologists have generally 
approached the notion of value from three different angles: economic, sociological, and 
linguistic. From an economic perspective, “value” is understood as a measure of the 
degree to which a certain object is desired. While sociology focuses on “values”, in the 
plural form, seen as conceptions of what is ultimately desirable in human life. On the 
other hand, “value” is generally seen by linguists as meaningful difference. 
In our times, many social ‘values’ can be packaged and exchanged for their economic 
‘value’, social security as an insurance policy or prestige in the form of a newly released 
electronic gadget, and this seems to be extendable to almost everything (Graeber, 2001). 
In this way and to the dismay of many, a tangerine can be exchanged for prestige in the 
market, revealing their surprising commensurability. 
But is there any connection between the value of a tangerine and that of prestige, peace, 
or creativity, between material and social values? Where does the material end and 
where does the social begin? How can we bridge between two, seemingly, very 
different perspectives? And what could be a possible link between ‘value’, ‘values’, and 
‘meaning’? 
1.1. Value and the deceptive commensurability of ‘things’ 
Let us start arbitrarily from the tangerine and the notion of economic value. Let us then 
see if we can discern the material origin of economic value searching for the source of 
the apparent commensurability of ‘things’. 
A tangerine, as we all seem to recognize, is an object or a ‘thing’. When it comes with a 
money-price it becomes a commodity. We generally assume that the money-price of a 
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commodity is its value. That is why economists study the economic value using money 
as a common denominator. Thus, since they seem to take the apparent equivalence of 
value and money for granted, we will have to skip for now the view of neoclassical 
economists who see value originating in consumer preferences (Hornborg, 2014), and 
look instead at the labor theory of value examining where it could lead us. 
In the Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith postulates that, in fact, labor, “never varying in 
its own value, is alone the ultimate and real standard by which the value of all 
commodities can at all times and places be estimated and compared. It is their real 
price; money is their nominal price only” (1776, p. 37). David Ricardo further 
developed those remarks into a labor theory of value that was driven by Karl Marx in a 
completely different direction (Harvey, 2010).  
To build his theory, Marx (1867) compares commodities to other objects. The 
difference he notices is that commodities involve exchange which means that they are 
somehow commensurable with one another. However, this commensurability does not 
seem to originate in their material properties. Such material variance is what makes 
commodities just like other objects different in their utility. But when commodities are 
exchanged they differ only quantitatively. This ability to equate different amounts of 
different commodities is what gives them a twofold character, as opposed to other 
objects.  
So, a commodity has a ‘use-value’ which represents its utility that arises from its 
material properties and makes it qualitatively different from other commodities. Yet, the 
‘value’ of a commodity which makes it commensurable with other commodities is that 
one aspect that all commodities share and that is, in Marx’s view, being a result of 
human labor taken in the abstract as a social substance. The magnitude of the value of a 
commodity is, hence, determined by the amount of socially necessary labor-time and 
that is the labor-time “required to produce an article under the normal conditions of 
production, and with the average degree of skill and intensity prevalent at the time” 
(Marx, 1867, p. 20). The money-price of commodities is, on the other hand, just an 
advanced ‘form of value’ or ‘exchange-value’ (Marx, 1867).  
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So, Marx’s notion of ‘value’ appears to differ from that of Ricardo’s by the mere 
addition of the terms ‘socially necessary’ (Harvey, 2010). But, by doing so, Marx 
clearly puts the notion of value back in the social realm. The problem is that when he 
talks about value, what he seems to describe is the value of commodities, the sort of 
‘things’ that are produced for exchange (i.e. for others). James Carrier seems to extend 
the notion of commodity a little further to “include things, whether material or not, that 
are not produced in the conventional sense but that can be appropriated and used for 
commercial gain.” (2010, p. 674). The example he gives is one of a hotel set in a 
spectacular location commodifying the view from the veranda by making it a “part of 
what is being sold in market transactions even though the hotel did not produce the 
scenery” (Carrier, 2010, p. 675). 
By stretching Marx’s notion of commodity, it becomes unavoidable to reassess that 
which in his view turns something into a commodity: ‘value’. The view from the 
veranda is definitely a ‘use-value’; the fact that it can be exchanged shows that it has a 
‘value-form’; but where is then the ‘value’ of such a commodity if there is no human 
labor embodied in it?  
 All in nature are interdependent: my little rain forest cannot be bounded 
and separated from the Rubber Tree. It depends on the Rubber Tree. As I 
do. People are part of nature, aren't they? But accounting, like any 
language, names, bounds and thus separates. (Hines, 1991, p. 27) 
In this quote from her short article titled On Valuing Nature, Ruth Hines is giving us a 
hint towards the root of the matter. When Marx sets to describe a commodity as having 
a twofold character, he uses language to name, bound, and separate between its ‘use-
value’ and its ‘value’. The use-value of a commodity portrays its utility and, for him, 
this is determined by the objective characteristics of the thing. The value of the 
commodity is, on the other hand, a manifestation of the subjective human creative labor 
(Marx, 1867). 
By separating between what he sees as objective and subjective, Marx is, in fact, 
separating between what he deems to be human and what is not. For him, it is human 
labor that adds value and that labor, and only that labor, is what is being abstracted 
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when commodities are exchanged. It is human labor that turns wood into a table (Marx, 
1867). Moreover, a table is a commodity because it is wood plus human labor in the 
abstract. Wood exists in nature but the labor that goes into making it a table is of the 
realm of society. In separating between the objective and the subjective, the natural and 
the social, Marx is actually separating between people and nature. Thus, comes to mind 
Hines’s provocative question: aren’t people part of nature? 
Now, let us go back to Carrier’s example of the spectacular ‘scenery’. What is in that 
scenery that makes it commensurable with other commodities? What is the one attribute 
common to the production of the physical scenery and the human production of a table, 
the one thing that is expended in both cases? 
If we forget about the notion of ‘socially necessary’ for a bit, and abstract the labor that 
goes into the production of a table from being “a productive expenditure of human 
brains, nerves, and muscles” (Marx, 1867, p. 24) to being an expenditure of energy, we 
might have then a common denominator. After all the expenditure of human brains, 
nerves, and muscles is an expenditure of energy; therefore, labor is an expenditure of 
energy (Costanza, 1980). The table becomes, thus, the result of the aggregate of the 
energy expanded in its production throughout the entire supply chain and the solar 
energy that feeds the trees from which wood is extracted. Being the result of energy 
expenditure is what the table and the scenery have in common. 
Robert Costanza remarks that “usually, the energy required to produce labor and 
government services and the solar energy input to the economy are ignored by analysts. 
The former omission can be traced to the assumption that traditional primary factors of 
economic production – land, labor, and capital – are independent.” (1980, p. 1219) He 
believes that they are not. Instead they are all results of qualitatively different forms of 
energy expenditure (Costanza, 1980). Alf Hornborg (2014) observes that for Costanza 
and Neo-Physiocrat ecological economists, value should be defined, consequently, by 
the quantity of embodied energy or other natural values. And in doing so, they are 
expanding in fact Ricardo’s notion of value. What would happen then if we do so to 
Marx’s definition?  
 
 
 
 
9 
By stretching the concept of labor and replacing it by the wider notion of energy, we are 
transferring some nuances of subjectivity from Marx’s idea of ‘value’ to ‘use value’, 
and some of the objectivity in the other way around. The analysis we have followed so 
far shows us how the lines between these concepts are indeed very blurry. Marx may 
have committed a sin by separating people from nature, but his indulgence lies in that 
same chapter where he does so: “with reference to use-value, the labour contained in a 
commodity counts only qualitatively, with reference to value it counts only 
quantitatively, and must first be reduced to human labour pure and simple” (Marx, 
1867, p. 25).  
By expanding the concept of labor and replacing it by the energy “pure and simple”, 
whatever the source it comes from and the form it takes, we have drawn the line 
between the ‘use-value’ and the ‘value’ of a commodity slightly differently than Marx 
but his description of the twofold nature of the commodity still holds. Moreover, we can 
now perceive this twofold nature in ‘things’, in general. That which makes a ‘thing’ of 
utility is its qualitative difference from the rest of ‘things’; that which makes it 
commensurable when exchanged is the energy-time socially necessary for its 
production.  
Driving the notion of ‘value’ this deep prompts us to start removing all the different 
boundaries we have established between commodities and ‘things’, and consequently, 
between humans and their societies, and nature. It may also prove to be very convenient 
to explain to us capitalism’s incredible ability to commodify everything in its sight: 
social security as insurance policy, art and ideas as intellectual property, or self-esteem 
in a bottle of deodorant. But if energy is that one thing that makes the scenery, the 
tangerine, the table, the ideas of the heretic, and their producers be all reduced to ashes, 
energy alone would never be sufficient to recreate them.  
1.2. Value and the diversity of ‘things’ 
Capitalism’s ability to reify everything into a commodity asserts this illusive 
quantitative commensurability of ‘things’ that we have revealed in the previous section 
by deducing, so far and as a first step, that the value of a ‘thing’ arises, partly, from the 
energy expended in its production. Yet, this does not expose the qualitative difference 
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that gives ‘things’ their utility or ‘use-value’ and lead them to being exchanged in the 
first place. What is then the origin of the uniqueness of ‘things’ and their diversity? 
To answer that question, we can perhaps start by examining societies where such 
‘things’ are exchanged without necessarily being quantitatively commensurable, 
societies where ‘things’ are not commodities. Graeber clarifies this based on the work 
of Christopher Gregory (1982) in comparing commodity and gift exchanges explaining 
that in the latter “the objects involved have a tendency to take on the qualities of 
people.” (Graeber, 2001, p. 36) Gregory’s remark can, in fact, point us towards the 
origin of the qualitative difference between ‘things’. Graeber (2001) traces a line of 
thought that starts from Marcel Mauss who observed that there is always something 
from the personality of the giver that manifests itself in the gift. But what would happen 
if the gift is gifted again? Will it carry something from the personalities of the previous 
two owners? 
Annette Weiner apud Graeber (2001), confirms that this is exactly what appears to 
happen in gift exchange, because the value of a thing seems to reflect in a way its 
capacity to accumulate history. It is the specific history of heirlooms that gives them 
their unique and thus valuable character. This seems to occur in every society since we 
can always “map out at least a rough continuum of types of objects, ranked according 
their capacity to accumulate history: from the crown jewels at the top, to, at the bottom, 
such things as a gallon of motor oil, or two eggs over easy.” (Graeber, 2001, p. 34) 
So, value suggests the ability of a ‘thing’ to accumulate history from its circulation; it 
also illustrates the expenditure of energy, over time, socially necessary for its 
production. But by talking about time, do we refer simply to the period over which 
energy is expended in the production of a ‘thing’? And does history accumulate only 
from its circulation? Or can we combine the two ideas in one? 
In fact, it seems that we can achieve that by pushing this relationship between the value 
of a ‘thing’ and its ability to accumulate history further. But the moment we do so, we 
will have to, once again, reexamine the boundaries we usually establish between nature 
and society, this time, from a historical perspective.  
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In an article titled A Single Historical Continuum, David Christian (2011) suggests that 
an extended examination of history that goes far beyond human history reveals the 
unifying aspect that is the increasing level of complexity of the Universe’s most 
complex ‘things’. It becomes then feasible to perceive society as not something that is 
separate from nature, but rather as a more complex manifestation of the same. Christian 
comments that “the general idea of increasing complexity can help us to think of 
galaxies, stars, planets, living organisms and modern human societies as different 
expressions of similar underlying processes of change.” (2011, p. 16) 
The question that emanates naturally from this is: what are these similar underlying 
processes of change that lead to increased levels of complexity of ‘things’, and 
consequently further expand their diversity? What makes a tangerine more or less 
complex than other ‘things’? Christian explains how complexity is built “by 
accumulating, storing and disseminating information about how to make things that 
work” (2015, p. 67).  
Information is then the other ingredient in the history that makes ‘things’ diverse. What 
gifts carry about their previous owners and what makes them unique is a historical 
accumulation of information that is different from that of other gifts. Through an 
analogous process, the DNA builds biological ‘things’ (Christian, 2015), it is a record of 
their specific history. A tangerine is a tangerine and not an orange precisely because of 
the information it has historically accumulated, and that is similar to that of the orange 
up to a certain level and different further from it. 
Talking about information assumes the presence of a difference that “other entities can 
detect and react to”, says Christian who clarifies that even an electron can “be said to 
detect and react to a proton through its electric charge.” (2015, p. 66) In the same way, 
the proton detects and reacts to the electron. Information emerges then from a 
correlation of two differences (Christian, 2015) or, in other words, from the interaction 
of two ‘things’, an interaction that can be said to be dialectical. 
Thus, behind the tangerine waiting to be sold in a supermarket, is an accumulation of 
information coming from the interactions that brought it there, those that lead to its 
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evolution as a tangerine and not as an orange, and all the interactions in between. 
Throughout that entire process, energy has been consumed.  
So, the ‘use-value’ of ‘things’ portrays their qualitative difference. This qualitative 
difference arises from a historical accumulation of information that itself stems from 
dialectical interactions in which energy is expended. It is that same historical 
expenditure of energy that seems to provide ‘things’ with their apparent quantitative 
equivalence. We can then presume for now that the value of a ‘thing’ portrays a 
historical accumulation of information emerging from dialectical interactions in which 
energy is expended. Somewhere around there, there is still a social necessity to be 
revealed. 
1.3. Value as the meaning of potential interactions 
We have concluded the previous section by proposing that the value of a thing reveals a 
history of information gathered from dialectical energy-consuming interactions. This 
image enables us to erase the line drawn between society and nature. Society and its 
properties can thus be seen as that historical accumulation of information that recreates 
nature. Massimo De Angelis observes that “Humanity as a totality, in its metabolic 
exchange with ‘nature’, is not outside ‘nature’, but a moment of it.” (1996, p. 8) The 
social is a historical transformation of the natural, a qualitatively different 
rearrangement of the material, a rearrangement that arises dialectically. 
This sounds as close as it can get to Marx’s dialectical method and historical 
materialism, a materialism that is not stiff, fundamentalist, nor determinist as Harvey 
(2010) and Graeber (2013) remind us. The latter describes then a weak materialism that 
understands that society “can never be separated from its concrete, material medium” 
(Graeber, 2001, p. 54) yet realizes that it generates a different level of complexity and 
that, as Christian puts it, “different levels of complexity appear to yield new ‘emergent 
properties’, properties that can not be deduced from understanding lower levels in the 
hierarchy.” (2011, p. 16) 
To appreciate the new properties that emerge with the increased complexity of human 
societies requires digging deeper in Marx’s notion of the socially necessary. For Foster 
and Burkett (2016), this goes back to the dialectical theory of socio-ecological 
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conditions and crises developed by Marx and Engels. To talk about the socio-ecological 
implies a dialectical interaction between the two (i.e. the social and the ecological). If, 
as we have seen in the previous section, dialectical interactions give rise to information, 
and if both the ecosystem and society are complex sets of interactions, then from socio-
ecological conditions emerges a gigantic body of interconnected information. 
This network of mutually related information is what we call knowledge (Floridi, 2010) 
and it takes the form of “ecologically significant information [that] can accumulate 
within the memory of each community, within what anthropologists call its ‘culture’.” 
(Christian, 2011, p. 20)  But Culture refers also the socially significant information (e.g. 
information about how one should treat another and so on). Resulting from these socio-
ecological conditions and crises, Culture provides humans with an “increasing control 
over biospheric resources leading to increasing populations leading to increasing social 
complexity, in a powerful feedback cycle.” (Christian, 2011, p. 19) 
Accordingly, this accumulation of ecologically and socially significant information that 
is Culture can be said to denote not just the interactions of humans with other humans 
but also with nature and, consequently, all the interactions that happen within nature. 
We can then expand Marx’s notion of social necessity to one of cultural necessity 
describing both the social and the ecological conditions that bound interactions. If value 
designates the accumulation of information from any of these interactions then value is 
cultural. Moreover, anything and every ‘thing’ that emanates from these interactions has 
cultural value. 
This cultural value can be seen everywhere: in agriculture, the domestication of 
animals, the designation of ecosystems as natural parks, the naming of stars and the 
worship of planets, the baking of bread and the making of wine, and the exploitation 
and transformation of natural resources into commodities. All of that is susceptible to 
the powerful feedback cycle described by Christian. That is why Harvey reminds us that 
value is not constant but “subject to a powerful array of forces” and “to perpetual 
revolutionary transformations” (2010, p. 22). Cultural necessity is continuously 
changing. The pace of this cultural change is revolutionized and made much faster and 
powerful by ‘collective learning’ which stems from the human ability to “share 
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information with precision and in great volume through the gift of symbolic language.” 
(Christian, 2011, p. 19) 
Through symbolic language, and other communication tools emerging with Culture, 
information is shared as a symbolic network of interrelations between conscious entities 
capable of conceptualizing this complex form of information that we call knowledge; 
information becomes then semantic (Christian, 2015). This means that value, being an 
accumulation of such information, is itself semantic. That is, value is related to meaning 
or, dare we say, meaningful. So, what is this meaning that value indicates? 
Curiously, linguists often talk about the meaning of a word as its value. For De Saussure 
(1916) (Cit. Graeber, 2001), this value is negative; it can only be seen in comparison to 
other values. The meaning or value of a word should be understood by figuring out its 
place in a whole structure. This implies a difference between such values. Some 
anthropologists have borrowed this from linguists to describe value structures in which 
value can be defined, in general, as meaningful difference (Graeber, 2001). This echoes 
Donald Mackay’s (1969) remark that “information is a distinction that makes a 
difference.” (Cit. Floridi, 2010, p. 23) If meaning, as we have seen so far, stems from 
representative webs of interrelated information, then meaning implies a set of 
distinctions that make difference. These distinctions, mirrored by information, are 
reflected then in value, so what do they entail? 
Christian explains that “information reduces uncertainty by selecting one of several 
possible realities.” (2015, p. 66) That is the distinction that makes the difference. He 
gives an example of how a molecule of DNA with billions of rungs, excluding each 
three out of four possibilities, excludes as a whole an almost infinite number of potential 
creatures. In this way, “from all the possible things that might have happened, a 
message selects a tiny, not-easily-predicted sub-set, then it eliminates a vast number of 
other possibilities and a huge amount of uncertainty.” (2015, p. 67)  
Thus, information, emerging from past interrelations, builds the future by eliminating 
uncertainties. It is reasonable to think of the value of a ‘thing’ as an illustration of how, 
out of an infinite number of potential ‘things’, a ‘thing’ comes to existence by 
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eliminating uncertainties based on information accumulated through past interactions. 
“It is value, then, that brings universes into being”, observes Graeber (2013, p. 231). 
But if, as Harvey (2010) points out, a ‘thing’ is itself a representation of a ‘process’, 
wouldn’t that mean that what is brought into being by this accumulation of uncertainty-
eliminating information are actually the ‘processes’ that culminate into ‘things’? 
Perhaps, this is what prompts Graeber to ask what if “what is ultimately being evaluated 
are not things, but actions?” (2001, p. 49) For him, value is the importance or meaning 
of actions. For us, and not to lose sight of the dialectical spirit of value, it could be 
helpful to consider explicitly the reciprocal influence that actions lead to. We can then 
argue that value is the meaning of interactions and, precisely, potential ones. 
So, to summarize what we have seen so far, value is cultural. This cultural value 
illustrates the meaning of potential interactions. This meaning is shared as knowledge 
representing networks of symbolic mutually related uncertainty-eliminating information 
that emerges from past energy-consuming interactions and serves to generate future 
ones. That is why value embodies this information accumulated from past energy-
consuming interactions that eliminates uncertainty and serves to generate future ones. 
Or, in less words, value denotes the knowledge generative of future interactions by 
eliminating uncertainty based on past ones. 
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2. Interactions and the assumptions of value structures 
We concluded the previous chapter by proposing that value represents the knowledge 
generative of future interactions. Of course, what really matters about that value are 
those future interactions and how to generate them, the ‘how’ represented by the said 
knowledge. This knowledge appears to be restricted by assumptions pertaining to 
different value structures. So, what is the relationship between future interactions and 
the confined knowledge on which value systems are built? 
2.1. Constructing value structures on confined knowledge 
At the moment when future interactions are enduring in the realm of potentiality, they 
are object of desire. The knowledge representing past interactions not only eliminates 
uncertainties about the possibilities of potential interactions but also shapes their 
desirability. Meaning becomes then purpose. That is how value, as the meaning of 
potential interactions, is the symbol of the meaningful story that turns knowledge into 
desire, motivating consequently future interactions. These symbols, as Graeber realizes, 
are “representations of the importance of certain forms of action that become objects of 
desire that, as such, play a critical role in motivating those very forms of action that they 
represent.” (2013, p. 225) 
This relationship between value as the meaning of potential interactions and motivation 
brings to mind the concept of ‘will to meaning’ developed by Viktor Frankl (1969) 
responding to the ‘pleasure principle’, and ‘will to power’3. He saw the last two as 
derivatives of the first. For him, pleasure is merely the outcome of fulfilling meaning 
and power is nothing but means to that end. “Only if one's original concern with 
meaning fulfilment is frustrated is one either content with power or intent on pleasure.” 
(Frankl, 1969) 
This brings back the notion of power and struggle discussed at length. “The history of 
all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles”, declare Marx and Engels in 
The Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848, p. 14). However, Frankl’s remark can 
point us towards a different type of struggle. Meaning, existing at first in potentiality 
taking the form of desire, is defined through power struggles. Graeber observes how “in 
                                                           
3 Frankl’s logotherapy based on will to meaning, together with Sigmund’s Freud psychoanalysis founded 
on his pleasure principle, and Alfred Adler’s individual psychology employing Friedrich Nietzsche’s ‘will 
to power’, form the three Viennese schools of psychotherapy. 
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the end, political struggle is and must always be about the meaning of life.” (2013, p. 
228)  
This can help us expose how value affects interactions by shaping desires, which itself 
is done by molding knowledge. When confined, knowledge becomes the assumptions 
on which different value structures are erected and that serves to guide interactions. 
That is what seems to happen with social and ethical values systems. Graeber (2001) 
describes Clyde Kluckhohn’s theory of values orientation that looks at values as some 
sort of answers to existential questions, directing the conceptions of what one is ought 
to want by assumptions about the universe and human nature. That is why sociologists 
refer to ‘values’ as conceptions of the desirable. These social and ethical values are not 
just abstract notions but rather practical philosophies of life that have a direct effect on 
the behavior of people (Graeber, 2001). The assumptions about the universe and human 
nature that they are built on eliminate uncertainties about what could have happened in 
the past and in doing so eliminate uncertainties about what is possible but also what is 
desirable in the future. As such values organize interactions (Harvie & Milburn, 2010). 
Harvie and Milburn (2010) observe that the most desirable of the diverse forms of 
human interaction varies according to different systems of social and ethical values. 
Conflicts between these different systems of value pushes each one to declare itself as 
the rightful totality (Graeber, 2013), claiming often that there is no other alternative 
(Harvie & Milburn, 2010). Harvey (2010) suggests that this questions how and by 
whom such values are determined and that “that the manner in which these values are 
being imposed on us has to be unpacked.” (p. 21) 
2.2. The assumptions of economic value that confine interactions 
David Harvie and Keir Milburn (2010) observe that, just like other social value systems, 
economic value organizes future interactions. Graeber (2013) explains that the 
difference between value and values is the form taken by interactions, specifically 
human actions, or labor. “We speak of value when labor is commoditized. […] The 
moment we enter the world where labor is not commoditized, suddenly we begin 
talking about values.” (Graeber, 2013, p. 224) An interaction such as caring for elders is 
part of social and ethical values; but it acquires economic value the moment it happens 
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in a nursing home where it is commoditized and is supposed to be exchanged for a 
salary. 
Talking about economic value presupposes that this commoditized form of labor is, at 
least, the most desirable form of human interaction. This means that economic value 
embodies itself a system of social and ethical values that eliminates uncertainty about 
future interactions based on its own assumptions. It makes sense then to start unpacking 
the assumptions that such value structure is based on from this particular distinction 
between economic value and other values that refers to the commoditized form of labor. 
This is perhaps the reason why György Lukács (1971 [1967]) believes that it all goes 
back to the riddle of commodity-structure which itself indicates Marx’s theory of 
‘commodity fetishism’. 
For Marx (1867), as we have seen earlier, when two commodities are exchanged, their 
value embodies the labor of their producers. This labor appears then to them as if it was 
an objective attribute of the commodities. This ‘phantom objectivity’ is the result of an 
objectification of complex relations between people (Lukács, 1971 [1967]). But what 
this commodity-structure also hides is the objectification of individuals themselves. 
A core tenet of the economic value system in its opposition to the other value structures 
is its believe in economic (or market) freedom that “gives people what they want 
instead of what a particular group thinks they ought to want.” (Friedman, 1962, p. 15) 
For Milton Friedman (1962), and other liberals, freedom of the individual is the end 
value and is thus the purpose of any social arrangement. This echoes the principle of 
methodological individualism that reduces society to a mere collection of individuals 
(Graeber, 2001). So, instead of worrying about collective ideas of the desirable, the 
concern is what individuals appear to really want. 
Friedman declares then that “underlying most arguments against the free market is a 
lack of belief in freedom itself.” (1962, p. 15) Notice here how the assumptions carried 
by methodological individualism have reduced and equated the notion of freedom to 
one of economic freedom and autonomy, that would appear then to be ‘natural’ and 
desirable. These same assumptions characteristic of the economic value system are the 
ones that assigned the natural aspect to economic freedom and autonomy, observes 
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Carrier (2010). He explains that “the autonomous individual’s attributes, acts and 
effects are seen to spring, fetishistically, from within the person rather than from the 
interaction of the person and the contexts in which he or she exists.” (Carrier, 2010, p. 
674)  
This means that by commodifying human interaction, knowledge about the entire 
context of socio-ecological conditions and crises that leads to particular human 
interactions, and that we have described in the previous chapter, is hidden behind the 
veil of an apparent autonomy. An autonomy, although attributed to individuals, 
becomes alien to them, as Lukács (1971 [1967]) remarks, since it seems to be 
transferred to the products of their own interactions. Suddenly, ‘things’ acquire a 
sovereignty with which they govern the processes, interactions, and those same 
individuals that produce them. Marx remarks how to these individuals, “their own social 
action takes the form of the action of objects, which rule the producers instead of being 
ruled by them.” (1867, pp. 49-50). 
Stripped of the knowledge about the contexts and conditions of their interactions, 
individuals watch their autonomy disappearing as they stare, together with the 
observing economists, in awe and devout veneration at the interaction of the products of 
their own interactions in the magical realm that is the market. This omission of 
knowledge and information in the assumptions of free market pundits is perhaps the 
reason why Carrier (2010) prefers to describe market transactions as ‘naturalized’ rather 
than ‘natural’. Moreover, it is that knowledge omission that naturalizes the market in 
which these transactions take place. 
In this mighty market, often portrayed as a natural and universal law, when complex 
interactions are boiled down to commensurable economic values, public interest is 
supposed to be brought out by the invisible hand described by Smith (1776). Market 
transactions should then incontestably lead to optimal solutions because such solutions 
can only be “produced by the interactions of people each of whom possesses only 
partial knowledge”, as Friedrich Hayek (1945) remarks. 
The problem with Hayek’s insightful remark, that pretty much every proponent of the 
economic value system seems to miss, is that the power of this economic value and its 
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prime achievement is actually concealing knowledge, the one supposed to generate the 
so called optimal solutions. By atomizing individual market players and treating them as 
particles isolated from their surroundings, the aim of methodological individualism is to 
conceal the high volatility and uncertainty surrounding extremely complex systems such 
as human beings and their Environment. Gregory apud Graeber explains that 
commodity exchange “should ideally be done quite impersonally; therefore, there is a 
tendency to treat even the human beings involved like things.” (Graeber, 2001, p. 36) 
It seems then, as argues Louis Dumont (1971, 1977, 1986) (Cit. Graeber, 2001), that 
this principle of individualism is what gave birth to the economy in the first place. In 
societies whose wealth does not necessarily appear, following Marx’s description, as an 
‘immense collection of commodities’, the work of some of Dumont’s students shows 
that “it is utterly absurd to talk about individuals maximizing goods. There are no 
individuals. Any person is himself made up of the very stuff he exchanges, which are in 
turn the basic constituents of the universe”, clarifies Graeber (2001, p. 19). 
In contrast to gift exchange, Gregory (1982) (Cit. Graeber, 2001) reminds us that 
commodity exchange establishes a quantitative equivalence between the value of 
‘things’. So, all of the accumulation of information from energy-consuming 
interactions, that we have discovered to be the reason behind the qualitative difference 
between ‘things’, has to vanish for them to be commensurable. This deceptive 
commensurability of things that is the basis of the economic value system is thus what 
paves the way for the economistic notion of the maximizing individual who “is assumed 
to have a fairly clear idea what he or she wants out of life, and to be trying to get as 
much of it as possible for the least amount of sacrifice and effort” (Graeber, 2001, p. 6).  
These limited perspectives imposed by the assumptions on which mainstream economic 
theory is founded are perhaps the reason why Polanyi (2001 [1944]) advocates a 
‘substantive’ study of the economy that attempts to understand how people make a 
living, without being confined to the ‘formal’ approach that separates economy (i.e. 
household management) from the larger cultural sphere, just like it isolates people from 
their societies and Environment. This formal study of the economy limits decision-
making to the rational choice between alternative uses of scarce means; a choice that is 
best made if everything is dissolved into a system of universal equivalence and left to be 
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governed by the unescapable divine law that is the market. One has to wonder what 
freedom are the rational, selfish, and insatiable automatons left with? 
Theories that start from this idea of the maximizing individual make it very hard to 
perceive how such algorithmic decision-making process can lead to any form of 
innovation or creativity. On the other hand, top-down models of supreme social 
structures fail to describe exactly how society motivates human interactions, making it 
thus impossible to perceive how such structure could ever be transformed. Both 
approaches fall short of explaining change and transformation, observes Graeber 
(2001).  
What this reveals is yet another set of assumptions that both economic and other social 
values seem to conceal, one that deals with the comparison of such values. We have 
seen so far that the role of economic value is to establish comparability through 
equivalence, as opposed to other forms of social and ethical values that negate such 
equivalence (Graeber, 2013). Gregory (1982) (Cit. Graeber, 2001) explains that this 
comparison of options, implied in the notion of value, takes place as either a ratio, or 
rank equivalence. While the first one is ubiquitous in the economic value system, the 
second is prevalent in other value structures to ascertain a sense of intrinsic superiority. 
What both methods of comparison have in common, however, is that their ultimate 
purpose is to establish which of the compared alternatives is more desirable (Graeber, 
2001). But is this the only outcome a comparison can lead to? 
According to O’Neil (1993) (Cit. Martinez-Alier et al., 1998), both methods of 
comparison represent a notion of strong comparability that implies strong 
commensurability in the first case employing a cardinal scale of measurement, and 
weak commensurability in the second one based on an ordinal scale as a common 
measure. We have seen, however, in the first chapter how the commensurability of 
values is illusory. In order for it to be established, historical accumulations of 
information have to be reduced to simple statements or, worse, vanish entirely. 
Building their argument on this incommensurability of values, Martinez-Alier et al. 
(1998) describe a weak comparability that looks at the qualitative aspects of different 
alternatives. This would correspond to a third comparative method that Marilyn 
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Strathern (1987) (Cit. Graeber, 2001) adds to the previous two mentioned by Gregory, 
one that compares things to their origin. Graeber (2001) comments that what happens in 
this particular case is in fact a comparison of the origin of different ‘things’. If we revert 
back from the ‘things’ to the interactions producing them, as we have argued earlier, we 
recognize that when people talk about value, what they really mean is that they are 
comparing potential interactions based on the knowledge accumulated from past ones. 
Value as such is not just a simple static idea. Behind such an extremely ambiguous 
notion hides yet another complex process, that of the evaluation of alternative 
interactions. 
One of the most important implications of this realization is that the reduction of the 
information that makes up the background of interactions to a mere static 
representation, reduces the complex process of evaluation itself to a simple choice 
between already existing alternatives. Consequently, future interactions seem to be 
confined to a repetition of one past interaction or another. But how can anything change 
at all then? 
3. Critically conscious evaluation and potential interactions 
Throughout this essay we have uncovered layer after another of representations hidden 
behind the concept of value. But we can scrutinize this notion of value even more to 
reveal the process that it shadows, that of evaluation of potential interactions. Reduced 
to either a rational maximization by economic value or completely annihilated by 
concepts of intrinsic superiority attached to social and ethical values, the process of 
evaluation is boiled down by imaginary value structures in general to a mere choice 
between predetermined alternatives. Unable to account then for the processes of change 
and transformation and explain innovation and creativity, we are left with the great 
dilemma of “how to move on from understanding people’s passive contemplation of the 
world to their active participation in it.” (Graeber, 2001, p. 16) 
Let us start addressing this question by rehearsing the conclusions of the first chapter, 
this time illustrating the process of evaluation instead of the notion of value that 
symbolizes it. Evaluation is a cultural process. This cultural evaluation illustrates the 
meaning of potential interactions. This meaning is shared as knowledge representing 
 
 
 
 
23 
networks of symbolic mutually related uncertainty-eliminating information that emerges 
from past energy-consuming interactions and serves to generate future ones. That is 
why by evaluating this information accumulated from past energy-consuming 
interactions, uncertainty about how to generate future ones is eliminated. In other 
words, future interactions are generated as a result of eliminating uncertainty through 
the evaluation of the knowledge arising from past interactions. 
Since we are dealing with the accumulation of information, evaluation can be seen as a 
process of learning. Christian (2015) distinguishes three different learning procedures 
(genetic, individual, and collective) that seem to follow similar patterns of change going 
through mechanisms of variation, selection, and replication. In genetic learning, 
“information accumulates as it is locked into the biochemical structures of DNA 
molecules. Most variations arise randomly during reproduction. Variations survive only 
if the DNA molecules they inhabit are copied.” (Christian, 2015, p. 69) By selecting 
against such variations, environmental pressures generate adaptive change. 
Christian (2015) explains that individual learning traces similar paths with one major 
difference. It happens within individual consciousness instead of the outer world. 
Within this consciousness, information arising from past interactions is registered in the 
form of memories that vary with the variation of life experiences and the errors in 
encoding them. In this world of consciousness different than the outer world, alternative 
interactions exist in potentiality as memories from past interactions. Potential 
interactions are pondered against memories representing information about the 
Environment that is acquired from past experiences. The most fitting of these potential 
interactions to the modeled Environment is selected as the interaction that is realized in 
the outer world. Similar interactions are reproduced through the reinforcement of 
memories (Christian, 2015).  
We can see how meaning arises from the potentiality of the interactions and the 
Environment existing in consciousness. Because they are selected intentionally in this 
potential world before being applied to the outer world, we can think of these potential 
interactions when realized as being purposeful. As a result, individuals adapt 
intentionally to their Environment through individual learning that is very fast and 
specific because new information is assimilated instantly from the particular 
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interactions of those individuals with their immediate surroundings (Christian, 2015). 
But the information accumulating through individual learning, confined to the 
individual consciousness, disappears with the disappearance of that consciousness. 
Christian contemplates how “individual learning is Sisyphean; it cannot accumulate 
information at time scales larger than a lifetime, so it does not lead to a long-term 
change. That is why it cannot generate what we humans call ‘history’” (2015, p. 71) 
Collective learning starts by answering that particular challenge of the transient nature 
of individual learning and it does so by connecting those disperse individual learning 
processes (Christian, 2015). As such, networks of interrelated information that 
otherwise existed as memories in the confined space of individual consciousness are 
thus connected to each other in the vaster memory repository that we call Culture and 
that outlives ephemeral individuals. Muthukrishna and Henrich describe “how many 
human brains, which evolved primarily for the acquisition of Culture, together beget a 
collective brain.” (2016, p. 1) Information survives and accumulates historically in the 
form of myths, rituals, and cooking recipes, and is shared through language, books, art, 
and the internet. That is how “humans learn within teams of millions that include the 
living and the dead.” (Christian, 2015, p. 75) 
This capacity of collective learning to continuously accumulate information depends on 
the existence of the common pool of knowledge it creates. The ability of the individual 
consciousness to access complex historical accumulation of information through simple 
keys guarantees its continuous contribution into refining this common knowledge. For 
example, De Angelis explains how “people learn through history and communication 
among them to refine their tastes for food, wine, etc.” (1996, p. 8) The more 
information, flowing from varied experiences arising from slightly different 
interactions, is outsourced to the common pool, the freer becomes individual 
consciousness in zooming on specific issues dividing them into ever smaller integrals 
and pixelating the information describing them. In this way, shared knowledge can 
become infinitely more precise and refined.  
The more precise is the information, the more instantaneous and detailed becomes the 
functioning of the mechanisms of variation, selection, and replication. For instance, the 
alteration of one spice by mistake can lead to a slightly tastier dish. Such variation 
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would then be selected and replicated. That is how innovation emerges from mere 
serendipity, recombination, or incremental improvement (Muthukrishna & Henrich, 
2016). This innovation is only achievable over collective learning that is made possible 
and accelerated through the continuous interaction with the common pool of 
knowledge, emerging from socio-ecological interactions, that is Culture. Muthukrishna 
and Henrich (2016) argue that such innovation is sped up by increasing rates of 
sociality, transmission fidelity, and cultural variance. 
But the process leading to innovation and consisting of mechanisms of variation, 
selection, and replication can also be guided if these mechanisms are applied first to the 
knowledge existing within the conscious world (Christian, 2015). When potentially 
innovative interactions are pondered deliberately before being realized in the outer 
world, the resulting innovation can be said to be purposeful and the outcome of 
conscious evaluation. This evaluation is conscious and not only intellectual, because it 
also employs physical senses and emotional faculties4. Intellectually pondered 
alternatives emerge from and result in communication with the outer natural and social 
Environment, the world of Culture. 
Furthermore, since this conscious evaluation involves an analysis of the advantages and 
shortcomings of specific information, it can be said to be critical. Of course, the more 
precise is the information, the more accurate is the analysis of the merits and limitations 
of potential interactions, and as such, the more critical is the conscious evaluation 
generating innovative interactions, and the more refined are those innovative 
interactions. 
Thanks to this precision, the product of historical accumulation of information and 
knowledge, innovation that emerges from critically conscious evaluation enables 
compromise. Suddenly, it becomes possible for two people debating whether they 
should eat pizza or seafood to opt for a seafood pizza instead of one of them imposing 
their choice on the other. Innovative compromise can also appear, for example, in the 
form of a durable material that is also biodegradable, sustainable forms of agriculture, 
and energy provisions that are environmentally sound. 
                                                           
4 Marx (1844) (Cit. De Angelis, 1996) talks about the sensuous existence that is the collective of the five 
physical senses, practical ones (e.g. will, feeling, etc.), and so-called spiritual ones (e.g. thinking, 
contemplation, etc.) 
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The potential implications of this are described by Paulo Freire (2005 [1967]). By 
making choices that are ever more precise, the historical Subject not only adapts to 
reality but acquires the critical capacity to participate creatively in the process of 
transforming it. This means that, by being in and with our social and natural contexts 
and thanks to this critically conscious evaluation that can only progress with the 
development of Culture, we become capable, through our innovative and creative 
interactions, of integrating in our Environment. 
***** 
Graeber (2001) describes values as the false coin of our own dreams. But if value can be 
seen as the meaning of potential interactions; if such interactions can be emancipated 
from the might of ghostly value systems; if they can become the outcome of critically 
conscious evaluation; if this evaluation is recognized as the product of the common pool 
of knowledge; if this can lead to “a sense of shared meaning [that] blurs the distinction 
between individual and group success” (Christian, 2015); and, borrowing the expression 
from William Morris, “if others can see it as I have seen it, then it may be called a 
vision rather than a dream.” (2003 [1890], p. 182)  
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Conclusion 
The market and its economic value give the impression that everything is or can be 
commensurable. We have attempted to show in this essay that this apparent 
commensurability originates from the fact that everything is the result of energy 
expenditure. But things are different. We have argued that this variance emerges from 
the difference in the information that accumulates historically from the dialectical and 
material interactions that lead to their creation and in which the described energy is 
expended. Through these interactions society seems to shape nature. The social can be 
seen consequently as the recreation of the natural. Things can be described then, less 
abstractly, as resulting from socio-ecological conditions and crises from which a huge 
body of knowledge arises. This knowledge appearing in endless forms is what we call 
Culture. Value is thus cultural. As such, we have developed a view according to which 
value can be considered as being symbolic of knowledge originating in past interactions 
and eliminating uncertainties about future ones. That is how this cultural value 
symbolizes also potential interactions. 
We have seen how from this world of potentiality, meaning seems to emerge and shape 
desire. But values vary with the variation of societies and their acquired knowledge. 
When this knowledge is confined in the form of assumptions, value structures are built 
on them. The meaningful and the desirable differ between the value systems they 
represent; and when they do, those structures collide. We have argued that economic 
value shapes the desirable form of interactions based on its assumptions and in doing so 
erects its own structure that clashes with the others. In this economic value system, the 
divine is the market that fosters public interest through an algorithm implemented by 
maximizing individuals. With other value systems, these reified structures are models 
that differ from reality because of their inability to account for change and 
transformation. We have attempted to show that this inability is the result of the 
reduction of complex processes of decision-making to simple choices between 
predetermined alternatives. Accordingly, the composite process of evaluation is hidden 
behind competing notions of value. 
This process of evaluation, made possible through Culture and collective learning, can 
potentially be increasingly more precise, critical, and conscious. In doing so it opens 
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several doors. Democracy, for example, becomes then not just a matter of making 
simple choices between existing alternatives but can be converted into a participative 
process of collaboration and compromise that leads to innovation through creative 
interactions. These precise, critical, conscious, and creative interactions make it possible 
for us to situate ourselves in and with our Environment, or to integrate ourselves in it, in 
the words of Freire (2005 [1967]). Integration in the Environment replaces adaptation, 
adjustment, and attempts to save or preserve it as if it was something separate and alien. 
This, however, can only occur through the critically conscious evaluation generative of 
innovative interactions which itself is bound to the development of Culture. We believe 
then that any such outcome is only possible through the fostering of our common pool 
of knowledge. This is why addressing environmental and social issues requires 
participative, conscious, and critical creation of Culture. 
Of course, this is a story; one that attempts to build meaning and conceive of what could 
perhaps be a more desirable way of arranging our interactions. It is however a story that 
recognizes that it is just a representation of reality that can be ever more precise and 
critical. One way this evaluation of the process of evaluation can advance is by further 
assessing the relationship between representative notions of value and uncertainty. 
Critical evaluation leads to more precise knowledge which means a larger body of 
information which indicates in turn a greater number of variables or potential 
interactions which means more uncertainty. Ironically, the same process that eliminates 
uncertainty seems to generate more of it. Perhaps, this is the reason why the more one 
seems to know the more one recognizes the little they do. It may also explain why many 
of us seem to cling to simplistic or reductionist views seeking comfort away from 
uncertainty. This provides a path for potential investigation. 
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